Motivation and background 178 179
This paper considers how policymakers can ensure greater fairness in the way the large new 180 cost of paying for clean energy infrastructure is distributed across socioeconomic groups. 181
182
We start from the premise that the level of clean energy capital spending globally is projected 183 to grow from an estimated USD 214 billion in 2014 to USD 300 billion by 2020 (IEA/OECD 184 2014) and that very little public discussion has focused on what might constitute a fair 185 distribution of this spending burden. Some modelling work suggests that investment levels 186 would need to reach USD 1.1 trillion annually, in order to achieve mitigation consistent with 187 a 2-degree target (McCollum et al 2014) .
1 Distributive concerns are material here because 188 this investment tends to be motivated into existence by government subsidies, and the cost of 189 these subsidies tends in turn to be passed on to either tax payers or electricity utility 190 customers. Evidence suggests that the distribution of the costs and benefits of these subsidies 191 across socioeconomic groups is not being taken adequately into account, including in 192 programs in Australia (Macintosh and Wilkinson 2010), the United Kingdom (Grover 2013) 193 and California (Proctor 2014 ) that we consider in this paper. Some of this concern with fairness arose in response to the environmental justice research 217 that emerged in the 1980s. This work demonstrated that systematic inequalities exist in who 218 bears the exposure cost of pollution across racial, ethnic, and income groups (Rhodes 2003 ; 219
Schlosberg 2007), but also in who enjoys the protective benefits of anti-pollution policy 220 (Bullard 1994 ). In part to guide policymakers on achieving environmentally just outcomes 221 from policy, several ideas have been developed about what constitutes fairness in 222 environmental policy design, including in this journal (Neumayer 2000; Pascual 2010 ; 223
Pelletier 2010). 224 225
This prior work takes us some way to understanding the broad contours of how distributive 226 fairness might look in policy contexts involving environmental policy and pollution, but not 227 all the way to distributing the clean energy infrastructure burden specifically. The question, 228
therefore, that we set out to answer in this paper is, 'What practical guidance can be drawn 229 from existing principles of distributive justice for fairly sharing the cost of clean energy 230 infrastructure?' 231
232
The next section sets up a framework for answering this question in a way that we hope will 233 yield useful guidance for policymakers who work on related policy issues. Section 3 234 analyses what four established principles of distributive fairness have to say about achieving 235 fairness in the clean energy context. Section 4 derives from the principles three normative 236 criteria for evaluating fairness in policy design. Against these criteria, Section 5 evaluates 237 clean energy roll-out programs focused on household and small-scale deployment in 238
Australia, California and the United Kingdom. Section 6 summarizes and caveats our 239 findings, and recaps how decision makers might apply them. 240 241 242
Framework for analysis 243 244
Our aim is to establish a practical, implementable moral basis for fairly distributing the cost 245 of just one increasingly common approach to mitigating GHG pollution -deploying new 246 clean energy infrastructure. In discussing how this new cost should be shared we are treading 247 on the kind of normative ground that standard approaches in neoclassical economic analysis 248
are not particularly well suited to answering . In order to establish something 249 akin to widely acceptable prescriptive judgments about the desirability of different 250 distributive outcomes from policy, we therefore need to go beyond a positivist analysis of 251 'facts'. 252
253
To do this we engage with several of the philosophical principles that are coloring the climate 254 change mitigation debate. Our treatment of these principles may seem sparse to scholars of 255 ethics, but for economists and policy-makers who are currently discussing these issues 256 minimally if at all, we expect that a discussion focused mainly on the principles' instrumental 257 value will go some way to raising the standard of that discussion. Those interested in the 258 principles' deeper underpinnings and in principles other than the ones we have identified as 259 most relevant to this normative problem, can consult the references cited. 260
261
We have chosen to frame our question mainly in terms of the fair distribution of a new cost or 262 burden associated at least in part with mitigating GHG emissions, but we are aware that the 263 question could also be framed in terms of fairly distributing the benefits of clean energy 264 infrastructure itself. One reason that we chose the costs framing is because we felt that there 265 could be greater consequence for vulnerable social groups to an inequitable distribution of 266 costs than to an inequitable distribution of benefits. New costs seem more likely to affect 267 current welfare levels of these groups in absolute terms. However, in both the discussion of 268 distributive principles and in the evaluation of actual policies, we try to account for how 269 program benefits flow to low-income groups when they do, not least as 'negative costs'. 270
Another reason for our costs-focused approach is that decision-makers in this context 271 typically have greater control over how the cost of clean energy infrastructure policies are 272 spread than over who participates in them and therefore who benefits. 273
274
In any discussion of distributive outcomes it is important to distinguish between a policy's 275 proximate (or immediate) impact, and its final (or ultimate) incidence (Fullerton and Metcalf 276 2002) . It is possible, indeed common, for a policy to satisfy common notions of fairness in 277 its immediate impact but result in an unfair final incidence (Kotlikoff and Summers 1987) . 278
This can happen when the agents who are directly liable to pay the new cost or tax shift it 279 forward or backward through asset price adjustments and/or because the new cost may cause 280 equilibrium adjustments that alter factor prices themselves (Kotlikoff and Summers 1987) . 281
Our view is that decision-makers should aim to achieve a fair ultimate incidence in the 282 policies they design, but we also recognize that this is not always an easy ask. Technical aids 283 to policy design like detailed regulatory impact assessment and computable general 284 equilibrium (CGE) modelling will often be necessary to ensure that this outcome is fully 285 achieved over different time horizons and economic sectors. Our primary aim in this paper is 286 to direct decision makers' attention to notions of fairness in the proximate distribution of 287 public costs, which we see as an important first step towards realising fairness also in the 288 ultimate sense. We emphasize this and other caveats to policy implementation and design in 289 the conclusions section. 290
291
We have limited the scope of our analysis in several important ways in order to place clear 292 boundaries on our question and to produce meaningful guidance for policymakers. We do 293 not address the question of who should bear responsibility for historical GHG pollution or 294 what a fair shouldering mitigating its damage should look like. This is because clean energy 295 infrastructure by definition only mitigates current and future pollution. We also focus on the 296 question of distributive fairness within the current generation rather than the between-297 generations question. This is because inter-generational burden-sharing is well covered in the 298 debate over how to discount avoided climate damages (Arrow et al 2014) and because intra-299 generational burden sharing is most relevant to the financial scale of the policies we consider 300 empirically. We also limit our discussion to how the cost should be shared across people 301 within individual countries. This is because building clean energy infrastructure has to date 302 been almost exclusively the domain of national or sub-national governments. However, there 303 is considerable overlap between the principles we consider here and the principles that might 304 guide a fair distribution of the GHG pollution mitigation burden across countries (Ringius et 305 al (2002) 2 , and there is nothing to prevent our analysis from informing the international 306 burden sharing discussion, particularly insofar as it concerns international transfers to support 307 clean energy deployment. 308
309
Our analysis is particularly relevant to questions of cost distribution under clean energy 310 programs insofar as these programs are motivated into existence by GHG mitigation. In 311 practice, governments are rolling out clean energy infrastructure with diverse motivations: to 312 mitigate GHG pollution, to promote innovation and competitiveness, to improve the security 313 and stability of electricity supply through distributed generation, to reduce geopolitical 314 vulnerability by diversifying fuel sources, and for other reasons (DECC 2011 , EC 2014 . 315
That does not mean that our analysis is irrelevant to questions of fairness where the other 316 motives are present. It means that we see GHG mitigation -whether it be through displacing 317 fossil fuel-fired generation in the near term, or through enabling this to happen in the future 318 by way of stimulating innovation -as the motive that sets clean energy policy apart from 319 other types of energy infrastructure policy, and which therefore invites us to think about how 320 2 Ringius et al offer an excellent example of how fairness principles can be used to guide the distribution of GHG mitigation costs in an international climate policy negotiation context. Several of the principles that they find relevant to that discussion are similar in spirit to the ones we consider in this paper. However, there are several reasons why what is deemed a fair distribution of a burden among nations may not be seamlessly transferable to a within-country context where the concern is with distributive fairness among households. First, a prominent argument in the international context is that which appeals to the notion of a historical balance of justice and nations' interest in development and industrialization. This argument suggests that less developed countries should be allowed to enjoy the same emissions levels today that developed countries historically have done. At the level of households within a country this kind of historical comparison is much less relevant. Second, given that the lifetime of nations is typically much longer than that of persons, international burden sharing necessarily takes a longer-term perspective and therefore must include a consideration for climate change damage costs as well as mitigation costs. However, the immediate question for policymakers tasked with distributing the cost of clean energy infrastructure is principally a question about distributing a mitigation costs.
this relatively novel motive may change our ideas about who should pay for this 321 infrastructure. 322 323 A final way that we limit the scope of the analysis is by thinking about fairness in this context 324 separately from other policies and programs that are designed to help low-income households 325 specifically, such as fuel bill assistance to elderly households or winterization subsidies for 326 low-income households. One could argue that if one policy is excessively fiscally regressive 327 (infrastructure), and another is excessively progressive (fuel bill assistance), then the score is 328 even all things considered. We do not dispute this point. It may be true that 329 counterbalancing measures already exist outside of the clean energy infrastructure policy 330 context or that it is desirable to create these measures. Our point is that in order to decide 331 whether sufficient compensating measures already exist, or should exist, it is first necessary 332 to have some notion of whether the cost of this new infrastructure is itself being distributed 333 fairly or not. infrastructure is that it is widely understood among laypeople and commonly applied in 365 policy practice. PPP resonates with numerous everyday situations where those who cause 366 damage are also considered responsible for correcting it, and where it seems fitting that the 367 level of restitution be proportional to the damage caused (Miller 2005) . 368 369 companies can or should be held responsible for actions committed jointly by their members or for actions committed by one or more individual members (Feinberg 1970 ). While we do not deny that collective moral responsibility can be invoked in certain situations, we felt this principle was less relevant to our question than the others for several reasons. First, in the advanced industrial societies that are dealing with this new distributive problem, ideas of moral agency, acts, causation, and fault tend all to be aligned in notions of individual rather than collective responsibility. The result is that normative fairness criteria are more likely to find acceptance among likely 'users' if they are based on these more familiar notions of individual responsibility. Second and more pragmatically, collective moral responsibility does not get us a great way off the starting block in terms of dividing up a real, concrete fiscal burden, which is the problem policymakers currently face. If responsibility for a burden is deemed 'collective', then the problem of how to practically distribute it within the given collective entity still remains. Third, there are philosophers who believe in individual responsibility and philosophers who believe in individual and collective responsibility, but no-one to our knowledge who believes in collective responsibility only. If anything, then, it would be appropriate to treat collective responsibility as supplemental to the principles considered here.
PPP underpins international environmental agreements like the 1992 Rio Declaration on 370
Environment and Development and it currently influences the allocation of mitigation 371 responsibilities in international climate negotiations (Schwartz 2010; UNFCC 1992) . PPP is 372 typically embodied in the requirement to purchase GHG emission permits and to pay taxes on 373
GHG emissions (Cramton and Kerr 2002). PPP forms the moral foundation for the 374
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA -375 colloquially, 'Superfund' law) in the US 5 that requires polluters to clean up hazardous waste 376 sites that they were responsible for causing. In the EU, PPP forms the basis for extending the 377 responsibility of product manufacturers for the products they produce, to the point in the 378 lifecycle of those products where they become waste, creating an environmental burden. EU 379
Directives on packaging, electrical waste and end-of-life vehicles are premised on extended 380 producer responsibility (Lindhqvist 2000) . 381
382
One common objection to PPP is that it does not take into account the issue of excusably 383 ignorant polluters or pollution which occurs in order to meet basic needs. Two modifications 384 can accommodate these concerns (Caney 2005; Miller 2004 ). In instances where a polluter 385 cannot reasonably be expected to know that her pollution might cause harmful consequences, 386
there is an argument that she should be exempt from paying for the damage caused. Hence, if 387 there was neither an intent to harm others nor willful neglect, the agent's behavior is 388 excusably ignorant and her liability to pay should be reduced or cancelled. However, an 389 appeal to excusable ignorance is unlikely to be compelling, given current levels of awareness 390 of GHG pollution and its possible effects, at least in advanced industrial societies. Second, to 391 the question of meeting basic needs, there is considerable normative force in the idea that for 392 poor and disadvantaged households in particular, some pollution is an unavoidable side effect 393 of the actions they need to perform to uphold an acceptable standard of living. Given that all 394 persons have a moral prerogative to ensure an even minimally decent life for themselves, 395 they should thus be exempt from paying for their pollution. 396
397
Another practical objection to PPP is deciding who exactly the polluters are. In the present 398 context, this translates into finding ways to assign responsibility for pollution either to 399 households in their capacity as consumers of polluting goods and services, or to the 400 companies that produce and sell these goods and services. Insofar as this challenge is a 401 practical one, it appears surmountable. While counterfactuals can never be fully known, 402 several technical methods exist for apportioning responsibility for pollution among 403 consumers and/or producers and/or tracing responsibility to agents for discrete pollution 404 flows. These include the 'geographical' approach, the 'consumer responsibility' approach, 405 and the 'carbon emissions added' approach (see Bastianoni Practically this could take the form of a direct tax on GHG pollution or it could be proxied for 414 by fuel or energy consumption. Implementation might entail establishing a threshold 415 pollution level below which a household's contribution is reduced. greater proportion by agents who are best able to contribute (Broome 1984; Dodge 2005) . In 424 the context of mitigating pollution damage this means that agents who are most capable of 425 'Pollution is the imposition of a harmful waste product or emission onto the person or property of another without that person's consent; it is a 'trespass' under principles of common law. If the trespass is so minor that it creates no impact or inconvenience for the property owner, it will normally be tolerated.'
This means that a marginal unit of GHG emission may qualify as pollution in one country but not in another if the countries have different allowable emission limits. preventing pollution should shoulder the cost of doing so regardless of whether they 426 themselves caused or continue to cause it (Caney 2014; Miller 2001) . 427 428 ATPP forms the theoretical justification for trying to achieve distributive fairness in tax 429 policy through a tax regime that asks the rich to pay more than the poor, in absolute or 430 relative terms (Samuelson 1947 ). Pigou is often credited with arguing that if tax policy were 431 guided by a principle of 'least aggregate sacrifice' by society, this would effectively lead to 432 the ATPP (1932). Minimizing the aggregate sacrifice (in terms of utility or welfare) 433 associated with raising a particular sum of money requires that, at the margin, everyone make 434 an equal utility sacrifice. Given that the rich suffer less disutility from making payments of a 435
given absolute size, this means that they should pay more. This argument for ATPP therefore 436 rests on the idea of diminishing marginal utility of income: the disutility of paying a certain 437 amount of money is smaller for high-income than low-income agents (Greene and Baron In its agnosticism with regards to who actually causes pollution, ATPP may come across as 446 alien to ordinary moral thinking, eschewing, as it does, the notion of taking responsibility for 447 one's own harmful actions. It assigns responsibility on the basis of a pre-existing status or 448 condition -namely an agent's relative wealth, income, or ability -rather than on the basis of 449 agents' pollution-related behavior. However, it is likely that applying the principle in 450 practice would sit comfortably alongside the more intuitively appealing PPP, because richer 451 agents who are more able to shoulder the mitigation burden tend also to emit more. 452 453 8 However, utilitarianism is not the only ethical framework that can support the ATPP. The closely related 'prioritarianism' holds that the ideal cost distribution is one which additionally meets the requirement that the already worst-off (in utility terms) should incur a lesser reduction in their utility levels than the better-off (Broome 2012 , Parfit 1984 ). This yields a version of the ATPP which apportions an even greater share of the cost to the wealthy, relative to the poor. Most versions of egalitarianism would produce similar recommendations.
Applied to the problem of distributing the cost of clean energy, ATPP would assign a 454 minimal cost burden to poor households, even where they were responsible for a large 455 amount of pollution, whereas better-off households would bear greater responsibility solely 456 on the basis that they are better off (more able to pay). It would be consistent with ATPP to 457 pay for these projects with funds raised by progressive general taxation. It would not be 458 consistent to pay with funds raised by a flat tax or through a fixed levy on consumer energy 459 bills. Raising the funds through a variable charge linked to energy consumption would be 460 consistent with ATPP to the extent that consumption of these goods increases proportionally 461 with income. BPP states that whoever has benefitted from the pollution that has harmed or will harm others 466 owes compensation to the victims of that harm. The more an agent has benefitted, the more 467 she is liable to pay. BPP has arisen in climate policy discussions in response to the idea that 468 the current generation in industrialized countries should not be made to pay for their 469 ancestors' pollution. BPP answers this point by saying that the current generation in 470 industrialized countries should pay something for their ancestors' pollution because the 471 current generation has substantially benefitted from that pollution through developmental 472 progress and higher incomes. It says that in situations where PPP breaks down because the 473 polluters are dead (the 'disappearing emitters problem'), the agents who benefitted from the 474 pollution should inherit responsibility for correcting the damage caused by it. BPP's core 475 idea is that if an agent accepts the benefits of illegitimate actions then they should also accept 476 responsibility for the costs (Page 2008 (Page , 2012 . 477 478 BPP is distinct because it implies that the beneficiaries are obliged to pay not simply because 479 they are better off than others, but because their wealth was created in a morally dubious 480 manner. Beneficiaries are thus 'free-riding' on the harmful activities of polluters, meaning 481 that they are no more deserving of this windfall than the victims of pollution are deserving of 482 their misfortune (Gosseries 2004) . BPP is most salient in the international-intergenerational 483 context discussed above but it can also be brought to bear on the clean energy infrastructure 484 distributive problem within just one country and one generation. In such a context, where 485 polluters are still alive, advocates of BPP face two options. The first is to simply defer to PPP 486 and argue that BPP only applies when polluters are dead. The other is to maintain that agents 487 should be made to pay in proportion to how much they benefit from polluting activities, 488 regardless of who is responsible for the pollution. 489
490
The relevance of the second option can be illustrated in this narrower context by analogy to 491 theft. Consider that there are three agents in this example: a thief, a victim, and a finder. Say 492 that the thief steals some goods from the victim and then that the third agent, the finder, 493 stumbles across the stolen goods by accident. The finder would benefit from keeping the 494 goods. However, the rightful owner was harmed by having their property stolen, and has a 495 legitimate moral claim to not suffer this harm, and this claim creates a duty for others. If the 496 finder keeps the discovered goods, she may not have harmed anyone because she did not steal 497 anything herself, but she does have some duty to the rightful owner of the goods and should 498 ideally return them. 499 500 BPP argues that the direct beneficiaries of pollution (the finder) are duty-bound to 501 compensate those who are set to suffer a welfare loss (the victim) due to the actions by a 502 potential third party (the thief) that made the beneficiaries' wealth possible (Baatz 2013) . 503
Two points give BPP its normative force. The first is the causal connection it draws between 504 the agent that benefits from pollution on the one hand, and the victim who is harmed by 505 pollution on the other; the benefit and the harm share the same cause. Second is the idea that 506 the balance of justice between the two agents deserves to be restored through compensation 507 (Huseby 2013 ). should be allowed to continue to emit at those levels, even for example after new GHG 544 mitigation rules come into force. Generally speaking, 'grandfathering' refers to establishing 545 a two-tiered standard in law where one set of agents is treated differently based on prior 546 status or behavior (Robertson 1996) . GFP is different to the previous three principles in that 547 it is concerned with the distribution of rights rather than duties. and Recovery Act, the Clean Air Act, and various land use and zoning laws (Robertson 555 1996) . 556
557
The intuition that underpins GFP is familiar from other contexts where groups or individuals 558 lay claim to public resources through tradition or inheritance. One example is cattle grazing 559 rights on public land. In many countries, grazing rights are commonly allocated in 560 recognition of which populations, groups or families have historically used particular lands 561 for that purpose (Raymond 2003) . GFP can be understood more broadly to support the idea 562 that some rights are acquired rather than granted, which can be seen as acceptable so long as 563 the tradition or practice which created the claim to these rights was legitimate (Ringius et al 564 2002). While there are indeed differences between GHG emissions and grazing, not least in 565 that the former is often not traceable to undisputedly legitimate traditions, some argue that the 566 moral case for grandfathering rights has similar contours in both cases (Bovens 2011) . 567 568 GFP draws some justification from the essentially Lockean idea that past behaviour 569 establishes a claim to a certain way of doing things in the future.
11 It may hence be unfair to 570 agents that previously invested in assets that emit GHGs for a government to change the rules 571 governing the operation of those assets, mid-stream in their economic life and in a way that 572 the agents could not have reasonably anticipated (Menezes et al 2009) . Grandfathering 573 provides for such agents to be protected from stranded costs or other economic losses they 574 incur as a result of new anti-pollution rules (Harrison and Radov 2002; Robertson 1996) . 575 GFP can be seen as a way to compensate or protect groups or companies who suffer from 576 capricious government behavior. 577 578 A second type of justification for GFP is the Realpolitik idea that the generous entitlements 579 provided under grandfathering are needed to secure the approval and participation of the 580 powerful owners of polluting assets in anti-pollution legal frameworks (Gosseries 2004) . 581
Giving away pollution rights may not be a just distributive criterion in itself, but its 582 application is tolerated in the short term in order to avoid the much worse long-run outcome 583 of failing to effectively mitigate pollution. Recognizing this, a common modification to GFP 584 is to acknowledge historical claims and the necessity of political feasibility in the short term, 585 but then impose a transitional arrangement whereby historical high-emitters gradually have 586 their pollution rights reduced over time (Bovens 2011) . 587
588
Since GFP is concerned with the distribution of pollution rights rather than mitigation duties, 589 it needs to be adapted and extended to be meaningful in the context of who should pay for 590 clean energy infrastructure. If we interpret the right to emit pollution in the future as 591 equivalent to the right to not pay for mitigation, this implies that historical polluters should 592 contribute little to current mitigation efforts, and that historically non-polluting agents should 593 shoulder the cost instead. Under a policy like the British Renewables Obligation, which 594 requires certain large electricity users to purchase certificates guaranteeing that a certain 595 quantity of clean energy has been produced (Wood and Dow 2011), certificates could be 596 given away to historical polluters while being sold to historical non-polluters. Alternately, 597 historical polluters could be exempted from participating in the policy at all or compensated 598 outside the framework for the certificates they purchase, for example through adjustments in 599 the broader tax code. Since this outcome would run contrary to many notions of individual 600 and historical responsibility and so risk public non-acceptance (Neumayer 2000), a 601 'transitional' application of the principle might provide for distributing the cost of mitigation 602 differently once the necessary legal regime for avoiding catastrophic damages had been put in 603 place. 604 605 3.5. Summary 606 607 Table 1 summarizes how much of the clean energy infrastructure cost burden different groups 608 would pay under each principle. It specifies whether households would pay more, less or the 609 same, relative to a baseline where everyone pays the same amount, depending on whether 610 they are high-polluting, low-polluting, wealthy or poor. 611 
Criteria for evaluating distributive fairness 620 621
Here we use the four principles to develop three normative criteria against which to assess 622 clean energy financing mechanisms. Our approach combines all four principles to avoid 623 some of the strongest objections to each principle when taken individually. The practice of 624 combining principles is not uncommon among moral philosophers generally (Berlin 1990) 625 and has several precedents in climate justice discussions specifically (Caney 2005; Miller 626 2008). We aim to identify fairness criteria that address the practical problem facing decision 627 makers discussed in section 2: how to distribute this new cost burden across households 628 within the current generation, within an individual nation, in a way that the public 629 understands and supports. 630
631
In developing the fairness criteria we focused on how decision makers might distribute the 632 burden across households. This is because households tend to be the social unit governments 633 use to monitor the degree of socioeconomic inequality in many countries and so make a 634 sensible unit for thinking about the impact of new distributive decisions. Households are also 635 the most relevant social group in the three clean energy roll-out programs in California, 636
Australia and the UK that we apply the fairness criteria to below, both in terms of program 637 participants and in terms of payers (either as electricity bill payers or tax-payers). This 638 provides a certain symmetry across agents, payers, and beneficiaries. That symmetry that lets 639 us focus on how the burden should be shared across rich and poor households, which we see 640 as the main practical question facing decision makers today, as opposed to the deeper but 641 perhaps less urgent political economy question of how such a burden might be shared across 642 households and corporate entities (firms, governmental entities, other groups). 643
644
Proceeding with the fairness criteria, a first problem decision makers face is deciding which 645 households should be payers and which households should be non-payers, or stated another 646 way, whether there are households that should be excluded from paying anything at all. PPP 647 and ATPP give the clearest guidance of all the principles on how to define the relevant group 648 of payers for a burden that is pollution-correcting. PPP states that polluters should pay in 649 proportion to their pollution. This implies that households that do not currently pollute should 650 not pay.
12 ATPP states that only those who are financially able to pay should do so, thus 651 exempting those who are considered unable to shoulder the costs. 652 653 GFP can also be invoked to separate non-payers from payers, though the number of affected 654 households is likely to be small. GFP implies that some households have 'acquired' the right 655 to continue to pollute and by extension that they should be excused from paying, due to past 656 decisions they took in relation to pollution. This could be the case for households that 657 previously installed polluting electricity generation equipment at their residences under the 658 reasonable belief that they would not be asked one day to contribute to a clean energy 659 infrastructure program. This exemption would not apply to all households that previously 660 polluted through general electric grid electricity consumption however, because someone else 661 took the polluting investment decision on those households' behalf and so it is someone else 662 that would be harmed by unforeseeable government action. These exemptions would only be 663 justifiable under an interpretation of GFP that extends a right to pollute to an entitlement to 664 not mitigate. with different pollution levels and income characteristics once the relevant group of payers 684 has been established. Again, we can look to more than one principle for guidance. Under 685 PPP, fairness is present when a household's payment is proportional to its current pollution 686 level. The more pollution it causes, the more it needs to pay in order to undo the total 687 pollution damage. Under BPP, fairness is present when a household's payment is 688 proportional to the benefit or windfall it derives from polluting activities. The greater the 689 benefit it enjoys, the more it needs to pay in order to surrender the entirety of the benefit that 690 is traceable to pollution. Under ATPP, fairness is present when a household's payment is 691
proportional to its ability to make the payment. This implies spreading the absolute money 692 cost unequally (i.e., proportionally to unequally distributed income), but the felt burden of 693 making the assigned payment should be similar for all households. 694 695 Exactly how payments are linked to these metrics will depend on country context and 696 program-specific factors, and choosing among them and appropriately implementing them in 697 practice is a question for individual decision makers. In practice, all three types of 698 proportionality (pollution, windfall or ability) may produce similar policy outcomes, 699 depending on the correlation between income and consumption of polluting goods and 700
services. 701 702
The basic idea of proportionality in household payments is captured in our second criterion. costs across all types of households, but which overlook the distribution of program benefits. 720 This is because higher income households tend to participate more in these programs than 721 lower-income households. This means that even if decision-makers achieve fairness in the 722 proximate distribution of program costs, fairness can be eroded on the benefit-distribution 723 side when participation across social groups is variable. 724
725
None of the four principles gives clear guidance on the distribution of program benefits but 726 because this is an integral part of the overall incidence of these programs, the third criterion is 727 designed to protect the most vulnerable households, including on the benefit-distribution 728 side.. Table 2 summarizes the main features of the programs and our fairness evaluation. 758 13 We also recognise that there are other costs of deploying renewables beyond the capital cost. We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the substantial additional costs related to connecting and distributing electricity produced by this new infrastructure. We note that in the Flanders region of Belgium and in the US states of Arizona and Idaho, specific fees have been imposed on installation owners per kilowatt of installed capacity to cover these costs, and it seems reasonable the issues raised in this paper apply to the distributive arrangements under those programs as well. Under fairness Criterion A we looked for evidence that the program cost was allocated 867 mainly to financially able polluting households. We find that the funding method, which 868 links households' payments to their consumption of a polluting good (main-grid electricity), 869 is likely to link paying households to polluting households more closely than a strategy of 870 funding the program through general tax revenue. However, we do not find any evidence of 871 exemptions for households that are financially unable to pay. This outcome arises at least 872 partly from the program design decision to allow the electricity suppliers to decide how to the 873 program cost is passed on, with apparently little or no government oversight. We therefore 874 find that criterion A is only partly fulfilled. 875 876 Under Criterion B we looked for evidence that program costs were spread across households 877 in a way that was proportional to their ability to pay, pollution, or benefit from pollution. 878
Again, the decision to allow electricity suppliers to determine how payments were spread 879 across households creates, at the very least, opacity around how much households of different 880 types pay. We do not find evidence that Criterion B was fulfilled. 881 882 Under Criterion C we looked for program provisions that protect the lowest-income 883 households. We find no evidence of this on either the cost-or benefit-distribution side of the 884 program. Even if the electric utilities decided to distribute the cost across households 885 according to income or some proxy for it, this would have happened in spite of the program 886 design, not because of it. We do not find evidence that Criterion C was fulfilled. 887 is non-declining over time. Households whose income is less than 50 or 80 percent of the 923 geographic-area mean can qualify for highly or fully subsidized PV systems, respectively. 924
The California Public Utilities Commission estimated that 5,000 low-income households and 925 1,800 very low-income households would be eligible for these systems through incentives, 926 tax credits and other financing mechanisms. The program facilitates low-interest loans for 927 any remaining system cost. 928
929
We find that Criterion A was partly fulfilled because the California legislature took a decision 930 to spread the cost across electricity-using households, which as discussed above draws a 931 closer link between payers and polluters than funding the program through general taxation. 932
However as under the UK program we do not find that there was a provision in place to 933 ensure the program cost was born by financially able households. We also recognize the 934 California Legislature's intent that electricity bill payers as a group recover the program 935 investment through lower electricity rates, making the program cost neutral overall, but we 936 find no evidence that this arrangement nullified the contribution of households that were 937 financially unable to pay, either in intent or in practice. 938
939
Under Criterion B we looked for household payment levels that were proportionally linked to 940 household ability to pay, pollution, or benefit from pollution. Despite looking through a wide 941 range of policy design documents concerned with fiscal aspects of the program we do not 942 find any evidence of this. We therefore do not find evidence that Criterion B was fulfilled. context, to adapt and apply these principles to yield three normative fairness criteria, and to 957 use the criteria to illustrate in the context of three real deployment programs when fairness 958 may and may not be present. Throughout, our aim has been to produce tangible insight and 959 guidance for decision makers on this new issue. 960
961
Our message for policymakers is that distributive fairness under these programs is a 962 legitimate concern that becomes more important in a context of historically high levels of 963 within-country economic inequality. Decision makers can begin to address this concern by 964 holding up program design decisions against the normative fairness criterion we developed 965 here, to examine the distributive implications of those decisions. We have shown that 966 program designs may be fairer, or less unfair, if decision makers consider which agents 967
should be payers and which should be non-payers, if they are guided by the principle of 968 proportionality in how they distribute the cost across paying households, and if they also 969 include provisions to protect the lowest-income agents, including on the benefit-distribution 970 side of these programs. 971
972
It remains to point out several caveats to our findings for users of this research. The first is 973 that our aim has not been to discuss intra-generational fairness in any generality, but rather to 974 provide specific and practical guidance to policymakers who are interested in spreading the 975 cost of clean energy infrastructure fairly, particularly in situations where households are 976 expected to shoulder the cost. 977
978
The second is that clean energy deployment programs can be motivated into existence by 979 policy aims other than mitigating GHG emissions, such as energy security and economic 980 development. Our findings are most relevant to guiding distributive decisions insofar as 981 these programs are motivated by GHG mitigation. That does not mean that our findings are 982 irrelevant to distributive decisions in programs motivated by other reasons, but rather that 983 there may be different nuances to notions of distributive fairness under other policy aims. 984
The presence of other aims emphatically do not nullify the need for a fair distribution of 985 costs. 986 987 A third caveat is that the proximate distributive incidence of a program may be different to 988 the final distributive incidence, and that decision makers should ultimately be concerned with 989 the latter. One way to address this issue is by focusing on the distributive impact on 990 households as we have done here, as these agents may have fewer options for passing on the 991 cost to other entities. Still, decision makers can take steps to avoid unintended distributive 992 outcomes by, for example, using computable general equilibrium analysis to model and 993 anticipate these impacts, and adjust their design decisions accordingly. 994 995
